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ABSTRACT
Although high performing cultures are crucial for the enduring success of
professional sport performance teams, theoretical and practical
understanding of how they are established and sustained is lacking.  To
develop knowledge in this area, a case study was undertaken to examine
the key mechanisms and processes of a successful culture change
programme at English Rugby Union’s Leeds Carnegie.  Exploring the
change process from a 360 degree perspective, semi-structured
interviews were conducted with team management, one specialist coach,
six players, and the CEO.  Analysed and explained through decentred
theory, results revealed that culture change was effectively facilitated by
team management: a) subtly and covertly shaping the physical, structural,
and psychosocial context in which support staff and players made
performance-impacting choices, and b) regulating the ‘to and fro’ of power
which characterises professional sport performance teams.  Decentred
theory is also supported as an effective framework for culture change
study.
Key words: Culture Change, Decentred Theory, High-Performance
Sport, Rugby Union, Situated Agency
INTRODUCTION
While high performing cultures are central to the sustained success of professional sport
performance teams, sport psychology currently offers limited understanding on how they can
be actualised [1, 2].  Acknowledging the pan-continent ‘sacking pandemic’, whereby
professional team managers are regularly fired for failing to deliver consistent results in short
order [3-5], this knowledge gap in culture change delivery is a notable constraint in the
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optimisation of team performance and managerial longevity.  Indeed, as formal
conceptualisation of elite team culture change has only recently arrived, present guidance on
this change management process is almost only available from business fields [cf. 2, 6].  Due
to major methodological limitations within this latter line of enquiry alongside the hazards
of applying business-based culture change solution to sports team performance settings [6],
initial literature has therefore identified the need for domain-specific study into the processes
and mechanisms of successful professional team culture change [2].
While the creation of optimal cultures has long been an implicit goal of professional team
managers1 [7], culture change has only emerged as an explicit construct in applied literature
of late [1, 7, 8].  Helping lay foundations for the conceptual and practical development of
elite team culture change, Cruickshank and Collins [2] recently applied contemporary
theorising in sport psychology, social psychology, and organisational studies to define team
culture as “a dynamic process characterised by the shared values, beliefs, expectations and
practices across the members and generations of a defined group” [p. 340].  Using this
definition as a theoretical basis, the same authors subsequently conceptualised elite team
culture change as the management-led establishment of shared and group-regulated values,
perceptions, and behaviours across the performance department which persist over time and
facilitate enduring high performance [2].  As a tangible applied activity, culture change is
also: context-dependent (i.e., dependent upon performers and support staffs’ agreement
and/or accordance with change); context-shaped (i.e., shaped by the needs and opinions of
high ego/status performers, diverse support staff, outcome-occupied Board, emotionally-
attached fans, and sensationalising media); and context-specific (i.e., specific to the
unfolding scenarios of manager takeover at a team with bespoke history, traditions,
resources, and stakeholder expectations).  Beyond illuminating the precise focus, nature, and
scope of elite team culture change (i.e., what the construct is), initial work has also
simultaneously revealed the limits of pre-existing knowledge in comprehensively accounting
for the process (i.e., what the construct is not) [2].
Although sport psychology’s interest in group dynamics has led to a broad understanding
of the process markers or concomitants of high performance, such as goal setting [9] and role
clarity [10], the worth of these factors for delivering professional team culture change are
restricted.  Most work to date has examined these processes’ utility in non-elite/cross-team
samples, correlation with outcomes, value in isolation (i.e., not in packaged programmes),
and overlooked their efficacy and evolution during manager changeover [e.g., 9, 10].  More
fundamentally, no research has focused on the generation of shared team knowledge at the
individual beliefs level [2].  While understanding in group dynamics can direct practitioners
to what a high performing culture might look like, it therefore offers limited advice on how
managers can negotiate the varied, contested, and conflicting perceptions which characterise
professional performance teams and ensure that processes are accepted, internalised, and
governed by its members (n.b., intervention which fails to deliver these latter results is
temporarily imposing, not changing culture) [2].  Since leadership is considered to shape
member perception and behaviour [11], some may assert that such knowledge does already
exist.  However, leadership work has so far not extensively considered the: a) selection,
deployment, and evolution of behaviour in specific contexts; b) systems, processes, and
mechanisms which professional team managers should deliver; and c) extent to which the
action and reaction of performers, support staff, and external stakeholders (e.g., CEOs)
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1 Manager/management are terms used as general labels to describe any individual responsible for the performance
department of an elite sports team (i.e., the department encompassing team management, support staff, and
performers)
impacts on present and future decision making [cf., 2].  Beyond providing a partial picture
of team functioning, recent work has also identified that current popular theories, such as
transformational leadership [12], do not fully account for the behavioural repertoire of elite
team managers; as evidenced, for example, by the prevalence and need for dark traits [1, 13].
Reflecting its standing in contemporary elite-team enquiry, it is also important to highlight
professional team culture change’s links with and demarcation from organisational sport
psychology [14].  Regarding areas of overlap, optimal cultures have been increasingly
implicated in effective organisational functioning and the relevance of culture change
expertise suggested [e.g., 1, 15, 16].  For example, in examining a key member of national
sport organisations, namely the Olympic performance director, Fletcher and Arnold [1] found
that the “creation of a culture” was a principle feature of these figures’ best practice.  As this
particular study focused on general performance director competencies, however,
implications for the specific study and practice of culture change are limited.  Furthermore,
with other work in this field adopting a more holistic approach to organisational functioning
(including examination of chief executive officers, administrators, volunteers, and
committee members) [16, 17] and not primarily focused on culture change delivery, it is
difficult to extrapolate lessons for performance team-specific culture change processes.
However, even if culture change does establish itself on the organisational sport psychology
agenda, which seems likely and valuable [15], ensuing knowledge would arguably provide
diluted implications for the process as it prevails in elite team performance departments.
Similar to the inherent issues of uncritically applying business-based change management
frameworks [6], organisational sport psychology’s pursuit of holistic, organisation-wide
(rather than focused, role/department-specific) knowledge will likely curtail its ability to
provide culture change lessons which are optimally sensitive to the unique contexts of the
elite sport performance department.  To clarify, with organisational sport psychology
generating knowledge at a higher level of social aggregation (i.e., the whole organisation)
than performance team culture change (i.e., part of an organisation) [14], the intended broad
scope of organisation-level study compromises its ability to best understand and explain the
finer details which underpin and shape department-specific processes (just as both
organisational- and team culture-focused work are limited in their ability to understand and
explain individual performer-level processes).  In short, as culture change is dependent on,
shaped by, and specific to the context in which it is delivered, knowledge emanating from
organisational sport psychology will therefore be potentially useful but inevitably not
optimal due to key differences between elite sport performance team and business
environments.  For example, the motivations, needs, and preferences of professional sports
team performers – particularly those in higher profile sports – vary considerably from those
involved in administrative departments; as shaped by the complimentary yet distinct goals of
organisational and performance departments (i.e., sports business/administrative- versus
sports performance-focused) [18] and professional sports team performers’ high ego
orientation, inflated salaries, and media eminence [2, 6].
Extending upon these points, while management structures in both organisational and
performance departments may mirror autocratic, hierarchical models [18], professional sport
performance departments are unique in their nature and distribution of power.  For example,
unlike normal business employees, professional sports team performers are often paid more
than their ‘superiors’ [6], are responsible for ‘product’ delivery (i.e., performance) in a wide
public setting, and are subject to major attention from key external stakeholders (e.g., fans,
media).   Reflecting the extent of professional team performers’ programme-shaping power
[19], the success and survival of the performance team manager is arguably, therefore, more
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intricately governed by the beliefs, decisions, and actions of those they are employed to lead
than their management equivalents in more top-down organisational departments.  We do not
suggest here that business leaders are less dependent on their subordinates than professional
sports team managers; rather the unique nature and flow of power within a professional sport
performance team renders its ‘leader-follower’ relationships inherently different.
Recognising that professional team culture change is therefore an important and unique
construct, what type of approach is required to study its delivery?  Firstly, and aligning with
our earlier points on leadership, if the practitioner’s intention is to facilitate culture change
then leader-centric approaches are conceptually unsuitable.  While previous enquiry into
success culture creation has centred on the leader’s perspective [7, 8], enduring cultural
change requires people to change.  When Schroeder [8] interviewed NCAA-level
programme leaders, the omission of key internal (i.e., athletes, support staff) and external
(i.e. board members) stakeholders was therefore a particular limitation.  Precisely, this ‘data
gap’ inhibited a broad understanding of the extent to which change-processes and
mechanisms were uniformly perceived, considered impactful, and, perhaps most
significantly, whether they were at the root of performance improvement.  For sport
psychology to develop sound culture change theory and practice there is a need to embrace
social complexity and explore from a 360 degree perspective.
While assessing multiple perspectives may optimise the accuracy of interpretation, it is
equally vital that perceptions depict culture change as it prevails in professional sport
performance departments.  Although Schroeder [8] used Schein’s [20] organisational model
to guide culture change enquiry, and organisational sport psychology has adopted business-
based knowledge to inform work on elite sport organisation functioning [e.g., 16], a recent
review suggests that uncritically and directly applying understanding from business for
professional team culture change study is hazardous.  Specifically, while business has
devoted notable resource into elucidating the delivery of pan-individual change, Cruickshank
and Collins [6] have discussed in detail how knowledge transfer from this area is hamstrung
by: a) numerous and substantial methodological flaws, and, as detailed above, (b) the subtle
yet vital contextual and power-based differences between professional sport performance
departments and businesses.  It is therefore crucial that early exploration of professional team
culture change facilitates understanding which is sensitive to the setting’s unique features; in
particular its characteristic ‘power flux’ (e.g., the power struggle between management, staff,
and performers described above).
As well as acquiring multiple and accurate perceptions, it is also key that professional
team culture change work is explained via appropriate theoretical frameworks.  Recently
embraced by sport policy research [21-23] and further identified by sport psychology as a
possible interpretive tool for performance team culture change [2, 6], decentred theory may
represent one such approach [24].  Originating from work into the UK’s shift from central
governmental power in policy creation and delivery to governance through distributed
networks, decentred theory was developed as an anti-foundational alternative to previously
positivist-dominated literature on this topic [24, 25].  Specifically, based on the assumption
that governance arises dynamically via bottom-up processes as opposed to linearly via
institutional or structural imposition, decentred theory sought to reinstate individuals to the
“agentless” portrayals which had come before [21, p. 161].  As such, and countering prior
accounts from foundational-based epistemologies, the decentred perspective conceptualises
network members not as passive actors but instead as divergent situated agents: i.e.,
individuals who reason and act in a novel manner within the contexts in which they operate
[24].  By rejecting top-down and uncontested approaches to change, social reform is
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therefore depicted as a “chaotic picture of multiple actors, creating a contingent pattern of
rule through their conflicting actions” [24, p. 7].
On evaluating decentred theory’s underpinning features, a close match is found with the
contexts and needs of elite team culture change research.  Developmentally, decentred
theory’s move to uncover how governance networks (i.e., parallel of high performing
cultures) are constructed rather than their traits and outcomes (i.e., parallel of sport
psychology’s group dynamics work) or their links with central direction (i.e., parallel of sport
psychology’s leadership work) [24] mirrors the evolution of the elite team culture change
construct.  Conceptually, with such networks usually “[operating] through interdependent
relationships, with a view to trying to secure their individual goals by collaborating with each
other” [24, p. 3], similarity is found with the variously-motivated, multi-group make up of
professional sport performance departments.  Reflecting their pursuit of bespoke goals and
possession of role- and person-specific needs, preferences, and opinions, the elite sport
performance team’s management, support staff, and performers can also therefore be viewed
as situated agents.  Notably, the “radical contingency” [21, p. 161] assumed to emerge from
the interplay of these agents’ diverse and conflicting beliefs aligns with recent literature on
the personal, power-ridden, and contested nature of leading sports teams [26].  Finally,
although sport policy researchers have argued for a modified decentred approach to best
explain sports governance issues (accounting for the role of institutions and structures as well
as individual beliefs and practices) [21, 22], initial work in this field has nonetheless
reinforced decentred theory’s possible utility for sport psychology matters by pointing to the
perspective’s ability to illuminate social complexity, diverse interests, and multi-stakeholder
agency [23].
While sport policy research has positioned decentred theory within an interpretivist or
‘hard’ interpretivist epistemology [21-23], Bevir and Richards [24, p. 3] consistently assert
that “to decentre is to focus on the social construction of a practice [emphasis added]”.
Noting that “researchers may use similar methods but from very different epistemological
perspectives” [27, p. 89], it is the social constructionist position which appears most
appropriate for explaining performance team culture change.  With social constructionism
viewing culture change as “highly political processes of power, which result in the elevation
of specific forms of knowledge to the rank of the true . . . for a specific context [emphasis
added]” [28, p. 279], such an epistemology aligns with performance departments’ context-
and power-governed features (as described above).  Applying these philosophical
foundations, decentred theory consequently points to the saliency of unearthing change-
processes and mechanisms via methods which: a) “do not pre-empt or curtail the richness
and contingency of findings” [29, p. 39], b) consider a range of agents beyond those who
dominate through structural position [23], and c) focus on how networks (e.g., performance
departments) construct and reconstruct new ways of perceiving and behaving [24].  Via its
prioritisation of context, multiple stakeholder focus, and sensitivity to the dynamic and
contested nature of social processes, decentred theory may therefore offer an effective
account of professional team culture change.
Recognising the importance of culture change expertise for optimising professional sport
team performance and manager longevity, alongside the need to unearth theoretical
approaches through which the process may be understood, the purpose of the present study
was to explore culture change from a decentred perspective.  To advance practical and
theoretical understanding, the study had three objectives: a) to uncover key mechanisms of
culture change as perceived by multiple stakeholders; b) to elucidate systems, processes, and
procedures which manage and exploit the inherent power flux in professional sport
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performance teams; and c) to operationalise and assess the utility of decentred theory as a
framework for enquiry.  To meet these intentions, a case study of a recently successful culture
change programme was selected.
METHOD
Considering its ability to proliferate “multiple maps of the world as it is experienced” [30, p.
344], qualitative methodology was considered appropriate for enquiry.  The suitability of
case study methodology was also supported by its prior deployment in other work using
decentred theory as an explanatory framework [23].  Applying the terminology of Stake [31],
the present study was instrumental in nature in that it sought to provide a contextually-bound
account of the case and wider insight into professional team culture change.  Adhering to the
responsibilities of case study researchers [31], patterns of data were used to develop issues,
individual perceptions triangulated with others, and alternative explanations evaluated (cf.
trustworthiness section).  To meet presentational criteria, research questions have been
emphasised (cf., study purpose), the boundaries of the case set (cf., immediate proceeding
section) and assertions developed about the case (cf., results and general discussion).
SELECTION OF AN EXEMPLAR CULTURE CHANGE PROGRAMME: LEEDS
CARNEGIE 2008-2010
Following the professionalisation of Rugby Football Union in 1995, Leeds Carnegie
(formerly Leeds Tykes and Leeds RUFC) were named champions of English Rugby Union’s
second tier professional league (now named The RFU Championship) for the first time in
season 2000-2001 and consequently promoted (i.e., permitted entry) to the governing body’s
top division (now named the Aviva Premiership) for season 2001-2002.  However, despite
finishing fifth in their maiden season (therefore qualifying for the world’s most prestigious
club tournament, the Heineken Cup) and winning their first ever trophy in 2004-2005, the
Club was relegated (i.e., demoted) back to the second tier at the end of 2005-2006 (as a result
of finishing last in the Premiership standings) before consecutive promotion and relegation
in 2006-2007 and 2007-2008. Upon the Director of Rugby’s departure at the end of this latter
campaign, the Club appointed Andy Key and Neil Back (hereafter AK and NB) as Director
of Rugby and Head Coach respectively.  Arriving from Leicester Tigers, English rugby’s
most successful club, the team was promoted at the end of the management’s first season
before finishing tenth out of the Premiership’s 12 teams in 2009-2010, thereby maintaining
their status in the league and breaking the previous promotion-relegation cycle (for which
AK received the Premiership’s Director of the Year award).  The Club was selected for the
present study based upon AK and NB’s confirmation that their programme focused explicitly
on culture optimisation and that successful performance had been: a) recently experienced,
and b) delivered in the face of notable contextual challenges (i.e., history of successive
promotion-relegation; significantly increased level of competition).
PARTICIPANTS
A sample critically implicated in professional team culture change was recruited [2].  Beyond
enlisting AK and NB, one member of support staff (a specialist coach) and six first team
squad players were recruited.  As a further means for assessing the change process, two
players were at the Club before AK and NB’s appointment, two were recruited in the 2009
off-season, and two recruited in the 2010 off-season.  Additionally, reflecting the reported
need to ‘manage upwards’, with respect to gaining the time, space, and resources from top-
level management to facilitate optimal programme delivery [2, 6], the Chief Executive
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Officer (CEO), Gary Hetherington, was also recruited.  The specialist coach and CEO were
both employed by the Club before AK and NB’s arrival.
DESIGN
A semi-structured interview guide of open-ended questions was created to obtain a broad and
in-depth understanding of each participant’s perceptions.  To encourage specific detail,
follow-up probes were prepared.  Both guide and probes were piloted with three head
coaches and critically evaluated using procedures identified by Patton [32].
PROCEDURE
All participants were approached on behalf of the authors by AK and NB to gauge interest
in taking part in the study.  Upon confirmatory response (all accepted), individual letters
were sent providing further information on the work and commitments of participation.  To
encourage critical evaluation by the players and specialist coach, particular emphasis was
placed upon the confidential nature of their contribution and direct reassurance by
management that the Club would not be permitted access to any of the recorded information.
As naming the Club meant that there was no feasible way to conceal the identities of AK,
NB, and the CEO, these participants were made explicitly aware that they would be
accountable for their provided information.  All participants subsequently provided informed
consent, with AK, NB, and the CEO agreeing to be named in the paper and all players
agreeing to the description provided above.
Representing their joint responsibility for delivering change, AK and NB were
interviewed simultaneously and first.  Reflecting the retrospective nature of enquiry, they
were initially requested to plot a timeline of the team’s perceived performance against that
required of a top-four Premiership side (the management team’s programme goal).  It was
further requested that the emergent graph be split into phases representing distinct periods in
the change process as demarcated by major and chronological events [cf., 33].  This
depiction was then employed as both an aid to recall and tool to frame interview questions
for all participants (i.e., questions were asked in relation to the initial changes, transition
between phases, and in-phase events).  Cognisant of the intention to obtain data grounded in
individual experience, however, other participants were initially asked to share their views
on the timeline and provided opportunity to amend AK and NB’s depiction to best represent
their own beliefs, thereby tailoring their reference of questioning.  Similarly, while a semi-
structured guide was utilised, the interview was based upon a ‘talk me through it’
conversational approach and shaped by the content and natural flow of each discussion [32].
After covering all identified phases, final questions were asked relating to the holistic
process, nature and outcomes of the change.
All interviews were audio recorded and conducted by the first author in a private office at
the Club’s training ground, apart from that with the CEO which took place in a private room
at the Club’s stadium.  To inhibit current contextual factors interacting with retrospective
perception and individuals discussing their interview with those still to participate, all
interviews were conducted over 1 week (players over 3 consecutive days).  Interviews with
the players ranged from approximately 60 to 150 minutes, as governed by their length of
service.  The interview with the management lasted 250 minutes, specialist coach 300
minutes, and CEO 135 minutes.  The shorter length of the CEO’s interview reflected this
figure’s diluted picture of the culture change process, as dictated by their ‘distance’ from the
performance department (see supporting comments below).  All procedures were approved
by the authors’ institutional ethics committee.
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INDUCTIVE ANALYSIS OF STAKEHOLDER PERCEPTIONS
Aligning with previous decentred study [cf., 23, 34], inductive content analyses were
conducted on each participant’s data.  After reading and rereading the transcription,
qualitative analysis software (QSR NVIVO 9) was used to transform raw data units into
thematic hierarchies by recursively engaging in tag creation, category creation, and category
organisation [35].  To revise identified concepts based upon emerging analysis, the constant
comparative method was employed and conceptual memos recorded detailing evolving ideas
and key notes [36].  Reflecting the focus on team culture, all analysed players’ interviews
were then amalgamated to produce a set of perceptions indicative of the group as a whole.
ADDRESSING TRUSTWORTHINESS
Several approaches were employed to optimise trust and rapport with interviewees (later
corroborated by AK and NB).  These included: a) prior investigation of all participants’
careers to understand their bespoke history and current situation (n.b., the first author had no
pre-existing relationship with any participant prior to the research); b) observation of two
training sessions, the training complex, office environment, and a meeting delivered by AK
and NB to Club coaches; and c) knowledge of  and empathy with the demands of
professional team and culture change environments (as facilitated by the first author’s prior
experience as a professional soccer player and recipient of new managers’ programmes).
Member checks were also conducted, involving a 10-15 minute meeting with each
participant to discuss emerging results and the accuracy and fairness of quotes considered for
inclusion in the paper from that individual.  Importantly, feedback was sought on the
researchers’ interpretation of these quotes and the context of the results subsection in which
they appeared.  No thematic categories were changed from this feedback process and 2 of 34
exemplar quotes were slightly adjusted.  Reflecting their responsibility for programme
delivery, AK and NB were then provided with a full copy of the results to comment on the
paper’s overall precision.  Both reported complete agreement with its depiction.
Trustworthiness of the analytical process was also addressed.  Facilitated by QSR
NVIVO’s optimisation of transparency, the constant comparison method and conceptual
memos challenging interpretation ensured that evolving meaning was continually re-
evaluated and reasserted [cf., 36].  To further optimise rigour, a reflexive journal was
maintained [32].  Additionally, the third author (an experienced qualitative researcher) read
four transcripts (AK/NB, CEO, specialist coach, longest serving player) and assessed a priori
interpretations of meaning units against the labels created by the first author and their fit with
the overall thematic structure.  In the few cases of alternative explanation and queries over
accuracy, reflective discussion took place until all themes and their location in the thematic
hierarchy were agreed [31].  Promoting the first and third authors’ cognisance of their
presumptions and assumptions, the second author acted as a ‘critical friend’ by supporting in-
depth critique and investigation of emerging interpretation, discoveries, and explanations [37].
RECENTRED ANALYSIS OF HIGHER ORDER THEMES
Once decentred accounts are obtained, an understanding of broader narratives, such as the
culture change process, may then be achieved by providing a “recentred” [38, p. 139]
account.  By assessing the coherency of higher order themes across all groups (i.e.,
management, specialist coach, players, CEO), a triangulated, meso-level generalisation of
the change-facilitating mechanisms and processes was therefore obtained.  Importantly, such
accounts are required to maintain a description of “contingent patterns of action in their
specific contexts” and consider power “as something that flows up and down” [38, p. 139].
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The results consequently present and discuss the commonality of perceived performance and
action, discrepancy in perceived performance and action, change mechanisms, and power-
sensitive processes with these qualifications in mind.
RESULTS
VALIDATING THE CULTURE CHANGE: THE COHERENCE OF PERCEIVED
PERFORMANCE AND ACTION
Reflecting objectives to unearth the mechanisms and power-sensitive processes of
professional team culture change, we firstly clarify programme success to confirm the
validity of results and their implications.  Beyond enhanced performance (cf., method
section), programme effectiveness was verified by process and perception markers [cf., 6].
Regarding the former, inherent within the results are a number of processes introduced or
optimised to facilitate high performance (e.g., role clarity, performance feedback).  However,
viewing culture as a primarily social construction, evidence of programme utility is more
notably provided in the perceptions detailed in Figure 1 and Table 1, which show high levels
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Figure 1. Team Performance Level, Key Events and Distinct Phases of the
Change Process as Perceived by Each Participant Group
Phases displayed at the top of the figure represent those perceived by the
management. Where no lines belonging to the players, support staff and
CEO are present, this reflects agreement with the management’s
perceptions. Lines belonging specifically to the players offer a ‘best fit’
representation of the group’s perceptions as a whole.
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Table 1. Higher-Order Constructs of the Culture Change Program
Category 2nd order themes
Management Players Support Staff CEO
Objectives and planning Establishing an understanding of the environment N Y Y
Long-term objectives Y Y Y
Planning for objective attainment Y Y Y
Optimising the holistic Establishing an open physical office environment N Y N
performance environment Supporting the performance development of all staff Y Y Y (players only)
Building a staff consistent with the intended culture Y Y Y
Optimising the motivation and well-being of all staff Y Y Y (players only)
Managing the CEO/Board’s perceptions N Y Y
Promoting clarity Y Y Y
Feedback systems to guide action Player feedback Y Y N
Support staff feedback Y Y N
CEO/Board feedback N Y Y
External stakeholder feedback N Y Y
Team/Player performance analysis feedback Y Y N
Sport science feedback Y Y Y
Results feedback Y Y Y
Reinforcement strategies Consistency of discourse and action Y Y Y
Maintenance of systems, processes and procedures Y Y Y
Reward and protection systems Y Y N
Optimising external perceptions Y Y Y
Leadership and interpersonal qualities Displaying confidence in action Y Y Y
Assuming ultimate responsibility for direction Y Y N
Libertarian Paternalism Y Y N
Informal working style Y Y Y
Openness and honesty Y Y Y
Adaptive to environmental complexity Y Y Y
Role models for the culture Y Y N
Motivational/inspirational discourse and action Y Y N
Experience of high performance environments Y Y Y
Pragmatism Y Y Y
Understanding of their roles and responsibilities N Y Y
Innovative and comprehensive planners Y Y Y
Respectful of others Y Y Y
Driven and competitive Y Y Y
Additions to constructs on leadership Highly respected Highly Highly 
Expert coaches respected respected
Ruthless behind closed doors
Note. Y’s in bold and italic font = themes perceived as having been delivered with sub-optimal efficacy.
denote sources which promoted a ‘regulated’ share of power between management and other group
of agreement between management and key stakeholders on the methods, phases, and key
events of the change programme.
Almost all methods detailed in Table 1 were perceived as effective, with the consistency
and maintenance of action, providing ownership, and promoting clarity appearing to have the
greatest impact on programme success.  For example, the latter theme was manifest across
all higher order concepts and included providing all individuals with an understanding of
their roles, expectations of their conduct, and the reasons behind the management’s past,
present, and future action.  However, while pan-stakeholder coherence supports the
prevalence of a high performing culture, we also briefly consider the limited discrepancies
to highlight some key ‘decentred’ challenges and refine the context against which the
culture-facilitating mechanisms and power-sensitive processes can be evaluated.
DISCREPANCIES IN PERCEIVED PERFORMANCE.
Contrasting the management’s view that “where we were going and where our team is going,
you have only got to see that the performance got better and better and better” (AK), the
other groups commonly revealed that this was not strictly the case (as shown in Figure 1);
particularly during the second season when losing eight of the first ten Premiership matches:
“It just kind of clicked after a while . . . . We started off pretty slow and I don’t think we kind
of gradually got better; we were pretty bad, then slowly we figured it out” (Player 4).  As
suggested, match outcomes had a greater impact on perceived progress than reported by AK
and NB.  Contextually significant victories or peak performances, for example after a run of
poor results, had the ability to act as tipping points which reaffirmed belief in the programme,
created a sense of momentum, and reduced anxiety.  While enhanced performance was
uniformly perceived across all stakeholders, the challenge of delivering a process-focused
culture change in the outcome-focused environment of elite sport was therefore clear.
DISCREPANCIES IN PERCEIVED ACTION.
Although many themes derived from the CEO were common to other groups (see Table 1),
this individual’s account was notably not as detailed.  This accurate but partially incomplete
picture is unsurprising, however, when considering the CEO’s lower level of daily
interdependence and proximity with other groups. Indeed, the CEO saw such distance as a
key feature of his role delimitation against the more ‘hands on’ managers.
My role is to try and create the perfect rugby environment whereby the coaches can
coach and the players can play and there is no external influence at all.  I think it’s
exceptionally important because . . . external influences can be counterproductive
and thereby they have no place in the preparation of the squad and its performance.
Against the widespread commonality displayed in Table 1, all groups reported an
awareness of some players’ disappointment at a lack of information on their exclusion from
match day squads; problematic in that inaccurate conclusions were often drawn which then
shaped the perceptions of fellow players and staff.  This finding again reinforces the
decentred nature of elite team culture change and concomitant challenge of creating and
sustaining shared and robust performance-optimising beliefs when performers are publicly
judged by (non-)selection on a weekly basis.  Conversely, however, a number of players did
suggest that dissatisfied players were in fact largely responsible for this situation:
Every player thinks he should be playing . . . . Their door was always open . . . and
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they were always honest . . . . It’s quite hard for them to go and see thirty blokes …
and tell them why they’re not in the team so players should take responsibility.  The
guys who were negative were usually the guys not going to see them.  (Player 3)
MECHANISMS OF EFFECTIVE CHANGE: THE ROLE OF ENVIRONMENTAL
CONTEXTS
Recognising that the preceding results support the occurrence of effective change, a shift
from methods to mechanisms is necessary to address the study’s first objective and consider
how AK and NB facilitated group acceptance, internalisation, and governance of high
performing processes [cf., 2].  Reflecting decentred theory’s emphasis on “the need to look
for the origins of change in people’s contingent responses to dilemmas” [24, p. 8], we
specifically focus on how AK and NB facilitated pan-individual uptake of new and more
demanding performance-optimising behaviours.  Adopting this decentred outlook,
programme success was significantly aided by a conscious yet subtle shaping of the context
in which stakeholders’ decisions were made.  Expressly, via subtle regulation of physical,
structural, and psychosocial contexts, circumstances were created whereby stakeholders
would: a) make their own choices regarding the uptake of performance-optimising or
–impairing behaviour, but b) be more likely to consistently make choices which reflected the
former and ultimately support enduring optimal performance.
SHAPING THE PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT
Of first consideration, reconstructing physical properties emerged as a tactful mechanism for
optimising the motivation, performance, and wellbeing of all staff.  For example, an open-
plan environment was installed at the on-site training complex to facilitate the amalgamation
and transfer of information and to reinforce the support staff’s conceptualisation as a team in
its own right.
You could just pull on people all the time for information; you didn’t have to get up
and go and see if they were in a meeting and knock on the door. So there is just a
real ease of access to information and it just keeps people conversing . . . swapping
ideas, seeing how you can integrate your jobs.  Like I used to sit opposite
[colleague] and he would say “oh they need to have conditioning here this week is
there anything you need to drive home?” . . . between us we would discuss how we
can do a practice that will give us a skill and a conditioning element.  
(Specialist Coach)
Regarding the separate player environment, during the period of highly demanding
physical training constituting pre-season, novel and varied off-site activities were used (e.g.,
boxing, judo) to maintain optimal application (coincidently, and highlighting how shaping
environments could impact upon a number of areas simultaneously, such new activities also
acted as a leveller across skill levels, enabling an emphasis on work ethic which was then
employed to model behaviour).  In similar vein, performance data were also put on public
display:
I had a board up there where . . . I’d put their tackle completion up, so it was all
there black and white for everyone to see and that really generated a lot of interest
. . . . I’ve heard a lot of blokes coming in and saying “oh I’m only just one tackle
off, I don’t want to miss any this week I’ll remember that.”  (Specialist Coach)
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SHAPING THE STRUCTURAL ENVIRONMENT
Optimising the Structure of the Playing Staff
Alongside AK and NB’s key principle of staff ownership, by creating a squad in which there
was competition for every position players’ decision making was further shaped to match
that required of a high performance athlete. The shift from a culture where players would
often drink heavily after away matches represented one clear example of this strategy:
[Player] would come down [the bus] and say “were [sic] we allowed to have a few
drinks?”  And [NB] would say “well do you think it’s the right thing to do?”  You
put the emphasis back on them . . . . “Do you think we have earned it today?  Is it
going to help us if we all get pissed now?”  And they would come back and say “no,
we can’t drink!” . . . . There are . . . two good players competing for every position
. . . . so there are a lot of pressures on the players to make sure they are in peak
physical condition . . . . they understood they were in a position where they could
[drink] but they wouldn’t get away with it.  (Specialist Coach)
In short, building a squad in which playing ability was evenly balanced in all positions meant
that keeping a place in the side required consistent self-adherence to performance-optimising
perception and behaviour.
Objective Performance Monitoring and Evaluation
Extensive monitoring and evaluation of player performance also emerged as a key
mechanism for subtly ensuring the continued prevalence of performance-optimising
perceptions and practices.  For instance, while some players detested training with heart rate
monitors in every pre-season session, this condition was recognised as a “small way of
getting the best out of people because they won’t slack off [as] they can tell how hard you
are working” (Player 2).  During the competitive season, technical and tactical proficiency
was governed by analysis of match statistics against individual and team KPIs.  Deployed as
part of a pragmatic and evidence-based approach to performance development, its worth in
protecting against potential player detraction appeared highly valuable:
They will show us the last game: “Look boys you hit eighty-five [percent tackle
success rate] there, this week you hit eighty-eight and you just lost; next week if we
hit ninety we’ll be there” . . . . And then you can break that down individually . . . .
if you can give positive information in that sort of way it’s easier for boys to digest
and jump on board with the message that we are going in the right direction.  
(Player 2)
SHAPING THE PSYCHOSOCIAL ENVIRONMENT
Regulated Ownership
Regarding the psychosocial environment, of initial importance is the recognition that
ownership provision was not an unregulated practice.  For example, while match preview
and review processes sought to encourage player autonomy through extensive questioning
and challenging, both management and support staff ensured that answers drawn were those
perceived as appropriate and advantageous for optimising performance.
The players decide.  We influence them: we talk to them about what are the key
aspects in games . . . the anatomy of games and things that we want to focus on in
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training.  And the players generally, if you have got a rough idea of what you want
to do, you sort of work the players around so they give you what you want really.
But to be fair they are pretty shared opinions . . . what they would be saying would
be pretty much in line with what we were thinking anyway.  (Specialist Coach)
Leaders, Role Models, and Cultural Architects
By recruiting players with experience of high-performance environments and whose style of
rugby and personality displayed a fit with the management’s intentions, change was also
largely socially driven through the influence of player leaders, role models, and “cultural
architects” [39].  Specifically, beyond peer coaching and expert demonstration, these
players’ social power was harnessed to optimise group-level acceptance and ownership of
processes, systems, and strategies considered necessary to enhance performance.  For
instance, in a pre-season forum where performance goals and aspirations were obtained, AK
reported that “we were smart in a sense of mixing up . . . groups, making sure that the balance
of the groups, come the end of the forum, would have leaders who would be best suited to
summarise the outcomes of the five or six discussed subjects”.  In this way, selecting and
structuring groups around senior players with an expertise in the topic under consideration
facilitated the development of a shared and accepted message.
Optimising the Motivation, Wellbeing, and Performance of Non-Selected
Players
Another notable identified mechanism was the provision of extensive support to players
periodically, or regularly, not selected in the squad for Premiership matches.  Aimed at
optimising the holistic training environment by maintaining these individuals’ belief in
engaging with performance-elevating behaviours, this was achieved by: placing immediate
emphasis on these players after a squad was announced; providing an understanding of the
reasoning behind non-selection; creating tailored individual development programmes;
ensuring playing time in other competitions; and consistent recognition of their contribution,
both internally and externally through the media. This finding notably contrasts the earlier
perceptions of some aggrieved players, and reflects what was available when players ‘bought
into’ the management’s processes and stance.
[Player] . . . got put in the team in place of me . . . and even through this situation
… it was explained nearly every couple of weeks, informally and formally, of why
I wasn’t in the team . . . . I haven’t been managed like that before . . . . It makes me
want to train hard, it helps me; I go to sleep at night thinking [NB]’s still supportive
of me, he still thinks that I’m part of this group and I’m integral to it.  (Player 4)
Promoting Positive Experience with the Wider Psychosocial Environment
A further mechanism illuminated in promoting a culture of professionalism was the
optimisation of players’ holistic life experience.  For example, visits to local hospitals, young
offenders’ prisons, and coal pits were arranged to ‘ground’ the players and promote reflection
on the choices they made in the performance environment.  Players’ time away from the Club
was also optimised wherever possible for the same purposes, reflecting a management
agenda to ensure regular refreshment and regeneration of the players:
I knew that they were giving them a lot of time off when they can . . . . [The players]
say it just created that unity because all of a sudden the coaches are not just thinking
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of winning all the time, they are thinking of the players being at home and outside
rugby and keeping their wives happy and stuff which is important.  I suppose you
want your wife to be happy for you to be happy, and for the boys that are married
and for the boys that are not just to get away and refresh really.  (Player 6)
Management of the media’s influence on key stakeholders’ perceptions was another
notable strategy.  With such coverage influencing all Club employees, their families and
friends, the fans, and the local community, AK and NB provided a consistently positive,
future-oriented account of team performances and affairs to minimise the chances of any
negative portrayals derailing the culture change programme.
Regardless of whether you have got issues in the camp, you have got to try and
portray [a positive image] to the media.  I know it’s not the be all and end all but
guys do read the papers and your mates ring up from other clubs and say “what’s
going on here?”  I do it to other guys if a drama’s going on . . . . I think it sends a
message to our opponents and . . . us the players: You can say something at a
meeting which might not hit home but if you hear it in the Press or you see it live
in an interview after a game, I think that message carries a bit more weight.  
(Player 2)
Managing the CEO’s Perceptions
A final feature in creating a psychosocial environment consistent with the intended culture
was management of the CEO’s perceptions.  For example, as the CEO held “complete
control and responsibility” (AK), such action was necessary to retain and not replace certain
members of the playing staff and promote enduring, cultural change.
We went through our playing roster [at the end of season 2008-2009] and I said to
them “in your opinion is this a genuine Premiership player?”  And in the main their
perception of the players was higher than mine; but they did point out that to get
better quality players would be difficult so in a sense you are better going into the
Premiership with the players that we know even though ultimately they are not good
enough . . . . I think maybe they felt that they had made a lot of progress in terms
of their players’ understanding and accepting their way of playing and values.
(CEO)
MANAGING AND EXPLOITING THE POWER FLUX
As suggested by the themes, mechanisms, and quotations presented thus far, appreciation of
the power flux which characterises professional sport performance teams appears to have
been pivotal in shaping the manner in which change was delivered (see the ‘to and fro’
interactions detailed in Table 1).  For example, AK and NB clearly took steps to minimise
the likelihood of potentially dangerous swings in control and, importantly, optimise an ebb
and flow of command.  Regarding the former, ownership, clarity, enhancing perceptions of
and through the media, managing the CEO’s views, the influence of leaders, role models, and
cultural architects, and objective monitoring and evaluation could all, arguably, be seen as
means which protected against potential derailment.  Recalling that a to-ing and fro-ing of
action should characterise professional sport performance teams, however, more interesting
at this juncture are the systems, processes and procedures employed to enable this process.
Inherent within the feedback systems to guide action theme (see Table 1) were a number
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of approaches promoting a transient power share.  For example, as well as the previously
identified group forums, opportunities for known and anonymous feedback at end of season
review meetings were afforded.  An intermediary senior players group also appeared
particularly valuable and offers a good example of the to and fro interactions highlighted by
the decentred approach (see the linking lines on Table 1):
I set up a senior players’ group . . . . and I had a meeting with my guys once every
two weeks and that’s when we made our decisions . . .  I said to them [senior
players’ group] “ok what’s the issues you want [discussed]” and they gave me all
the issues from the players’ side, from warm up to everything and I went to [NB]
and [AK] and said “listen I’m just the messenger and these are the issues” . . . . As
players we got across a lot and they gave us a lot that we wanted, like . . . warm up
[structure] and times of training.  So they gave, and I think they wanted things from
us and we gave, so I think it was a good give and take relationship.  (Player 3)
As an effective adjunct to the senior players’ group, the management’s “open door” policy
and informal working style also promoted similar feedback on a less formal, ‘as and when’
basis:
For the most part if there’s ever any concerns you can just tell them right away, it
doesn’t have to be a specific time of year or at a meeting when a concern gets raised
. . . . You can go and you can talk to them and just be like “listen I need you to tell
whoever, sort this out, we need to do this, we need to do that”, and then they’ll just
go and talk to the coaches and stuff.  (Player 1)
Finally, and significantly, beyond finding a “happy medium” (Player 4) between
management and players’ wants, the opportunity for such feedback also subtly optimised the
governance of performance-facilitating principles by the playing staff; further emphasising
how the mechanisms of change operated on a number of levels simultaneously:
At the end of the day the players are out there and the coaches are there to point you
in the right direction and if it’s the other way round the players won’t buy into it,
regardless of whether it is about the way they play or the way the place is run. It
builds a culture, it builds a team, because everyone becomes tight-knit because we
all agree how things should be done . . . . I hate to keep using that word
subconscious, but it is something that only in hindsight when you ask these
questions that you think “shit, that’s why that was happening.  (Player 4)
DISCUSSION
The present study examined culture change in a professional sport performance department
and explained its delivery from a decentred perspective [24].  Regarding the general findings,
while elements of establishing an understanding of the environment, long term objectives,
and planning for objective attainment emerged as logical starting points, the examined
programme did not represent strict, linear steps but instead an integrated, holistic, and
dynamic process.  In this respect, accordance is found with decentred theory’s assertion that
social constructions (in our case high performing cultures) are a “complex and continuous
process of interpretation, conflict and activity that produces ever-changing patterns of rule”
[24, p. 7].  This result also aligns with prior sport-specific knowledge in that it is the manner
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in which performance-optimising processes are packaged and deployed which acts as the
catalyst for efficient culture change, not strictly the processes themselves [8].  Significantly
extending this insight, the current work also revealed that the high-performing culture at
Leeds Carnegie was constructed endogenously rather than imposed top-down, with changes
consciously engineered through the careful facilitation of stakeholders’ actions and beliefs.
Additionally, the dynamic, power-governed interactions suggested by decentred theory were
apparent and supported as effective by the participants.
Beyond these principle findings, key messages also emerge in relation to the paper’s
explicit objectives.  Firstly, the value of assessing multiple stakeholders’ perspectives is
evident.  Extending upon previous work [7, 8], such enquiry: a) enhanced the completeness
of management action, b) promoted an effective verification of this action and its impact, and
c) illuminated the socially complex and dynamic nature of professional sport performance
team culture change.  Shown by the contribution from players, specialist coach, and CEO to
the richness of the present findings, these results reinforce suggestions that the optimal
development of elite team culture change knowledge may be best supported by research
which employs multi-stakeholder designs [2].
Extending upon initial culture change guidelines for sport psychologists working with
Olympic sport performance directors [1, 13], the present research offers important
implications for the modus operandi of practitioners supporting professional team managers.
Beyond support for a number of processes’ utility in professional teams (e.g., 360-degree
feedback, role clarity, ownership) the most fascinating practical implication centres upon
optimising individual and group decision making through subtly shaping environmental
contexts.  Recognising the anxiety-elevating nature of change, the prevalence of multiple and
varied motivations in professional team settings, and the power flux between team
management and their staff, players, and superiors, the route to prolonged success may
therefore be best achieved by creating contexts which promote, but do not enforce, the
consistent uptake of performance-optimising behaviour.  By its nature, this result resonates
strongly with behavioural economists Thaler and Sunstein [40] and their concept of
libertarian paternalism; whereby individuals are free to make choices but guided toward
those which lead to optimal functioning (e.g., opt-out instead of opt-in employee savings
plans).  Aligning with decentred theory’s assertion that networks (e.g., performance
departments) continually construct, proliferate, and reconstruct their own traditions (i.e.,
ways of perceiving and behaving), the value of such engineering lies in its ability to facilitate
enduring high performance via covertly shaping ‘group’-generated and -governed beliefs,
expectations and practices; not overt, top-down or transformational direction.
Reflecting the dearth of culture change research in sport psychology and lack of robust
theoretical accounts within other disciplines [6], the article also provides initial support for
decentred theory as a valuable approach to study in professional sport performance teams.
By promoting domain-specific understanding via multiple stakeholder perspectives, the
theory’s methodological value is evident.  Analytically, through an emphasis on individual
and social construction, the utility of a decentred approach in accounting for the complex and
context-dependent nature of culture change is also apparent through the richness of the
results.  Finally, by considering power as a construct that flows between actors and groups
in all directions, the theory’s worth in elucidating systems, processes, and procedures
promoting the regulated ebb and flow of control is also clear.
While the study provides a number of bespoke implications for theory and practice, it is
important to recognise the study’s constraints.  Beyond generalisability issues, data veracity
may have been restricted by interactional effects such as poor recall, hindsight bias, and self-
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preservation bias [41].  Certainly, deciding to name the club, management, and CEO
provides one such source (however, see following paragraph).  Due to its retrospective
nature, not tracking the evolution of culture in real time also poses concerns over the
accuracy of the perceived programme and the precise ebb and flow of power.  Finally, the
omission of additional key external stakeholders (e.g., the media) and exclusion of
performance data analysis represent other notable shortcomings.
Nevertheless, while points for reflection, we encourage the reader to consider an array of
characterising traits which support interpretative rigor [cf., 42].  Beyond techniques to
address trustworthiness, decentred theory’s emphasis on inductive then recentred analyses
aligns with study’s context and purposes and, of equal importance, social constructionism’s
major tenets (i.e., consensus of multiple realities) [27, 28].  By interviewing multiple
stakeholders with varied roles, responsibilities, and relationships and including all voices in
the results, a number of pertinent perceptions are also comparatively represented.  Diverging
from previous enquiry [e.g., 8], this approach was enhanced by recruiting players who had
been: a) exposed to the programme for varying lengths of time, and b) regular and irregular
starters in the team (protecting against results as a function of selection).  With all players
and the specialist coach unconcerned about confidentiality, the likelihood of accurate
interpretation was further optimised.  Regarding the veracity of data provided by AK, NB
and CEO, all three conveyed no concern about being named in the research.  Supporting our
own belief in the accuracy of these individuals’ perceptions, we note that impression
management is a mediating factor even in anonymous research and that the CEO’s
perception of team performance level (cf., Figure 1) does not portray programme success to
the same extent as AK and NB, the specialist coach, and players.  Additionally, the
emergence of the same five higher order themes across all groups (including those whose
anonymity has been protected) must be acknowledged.
CONCLUSION
The study and practice of culture change in professional sport performance teams is a highly
complex challenge.  The present results also suggest that successful delivery may be best
supported by: a) subtly and covertly shaping the physical, structural, and psychosocial
context in which support staff and players make performance-impacting choices, and b)
regulating the ‘to and fro’ of social power.  Due to its infancy in the sport psychology
literature, however, it is vital that future research seeks to extend these initial findings by
examining other successful and unsuccessful programmes of change, the differing roles of
stakeholders, and the extent of decentred theory’s worth as a viable approach to
enhancement.
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